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Judicial Ethical Integrity:
Challenges and Solutions
BY MORRIS A. RATNER*
Challenges facing the judiciary and solutions to those challenges
were the topics of two afternoon panels at the Professional Ethical
Integrity conference hosted by UC Hastings College of the Law.1
The panels took place against the backdrop of a decades-long
conversation in rule of law circles that has produced statements of
common principles on judicial ethical integrity by the United Nations,2
regional international organizations,3 and other NGOs. 4 But whereas
*Associate Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law.
1. Symposium, Professional Ethical Integrity: Cornerstone for Rule of Law Reform
Around the Globe, UC Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco, California (Feb. 26-
27, 2015), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/news/articles/2015/02/ethical-integrity-
symposium.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
2. See, e.g., The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 2002, The Hague, Nov. 25-
26, 2002, available at http://www.unode.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judic ialgroup/Bangalor
e-principles.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2015); U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Commentary
on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (September 2007), available at http://www.
unodc.org/documents/corruption/publicationsunodccommentary-e.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2015); U.N. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh
U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 2
August 26 to September 6 1985 and endorsed by G.A. Res. 40/32 (Nov. 29, 1985) and Res.
40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/
IndependenceJudiciary.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
3. See, e.g., European Charter on the Statute for Judges (Stratsbourg, July 8-10, 1998),
adopted by the European Association of Judges, published by the Council of Europe
[DAJ/DOC (98)23], available at https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/
round4/European-Charter-on-Statute-of-Judges EN.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2015); African
Union, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa
(2003), available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/principles-guidelines-right-fair-trial/
(last visited Oct. 9, 2015); LAWASIA, Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence
of the Judiciary (1995), available at http://lawasia.asn.au/objectlibrary/147?filename=Beij
ing%20Statement.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
4. See, e.g., International Bar Association, Minimum Standards of Judicial
Independence (1982), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?Doc ume
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general statements of principles are designed to transcend country-
specific variables, our conference panelists engaged in a comparative
dialogue grounded in their direct experiences. Moreover, while
statements of ethical integrity principles have identified dozens of
issues of concern, our panelists emphasized three as paramount:
competence, independence, and corruption.
The panel on ethical integrity challenges facing judges5 included
Anthony J. Scirica, Senior Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit and a Senior Fellow at the University
of Pennsylvania School of Law;6 Hualing Fu, Professor of Law at the
University of Hong Kong;7 and Me Mario Joseph, a human rights
attorney and co-founder and managing attorney of the Bureau des
Avocats Internationaux in Haiti.' The panel on solutions to those
challenges was moderated by Judge William A. Fletcher of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit9 and included
Judge Evgeni Georgiev, a Bulgarian trial court judge;o Judge John
R. Tunheim of the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota;" and Mirte Postema, then Senior Program Officer for
Judicial Independence with the Due Process of Law Foundation. 12
Several of these panelists prepared articles for this symposium
ntUid=bb019013-52bl-427c-ad25-a6409b4fe29 (last visited Oct. 9, 2015); Draft Principles
on the Independence of the Judiciary ("Sircausa Principles") (1981), available at
http://cristidanilet.ro/docs/Sirac usa%20Principles.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2015);
International Commission of Jurists, International Principles on the Independence and
Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors, Practitioners Guide No. 1 (2007),
available at http://www.refworld.org /pdfid/4a7837af2.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
5. The Author moderated this panel.
6. See, e.g., Anthony Joseph Scirica-Biography, Federal Judicial Center, http://www.f
jc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=2128&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na; Anthony Joseph Scirica -
Biography, Penn Law, https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/ascirica/.
7. See, e.g., Professor Fu Hualing - Biography, Faculty of Law The University of
Hong Kong, http://www.law.hku.hk/faculty/staff/fuhualing.php.
8. See, e.g., Mario Joseph - Biography, IJDH, http://www.ijdh.org/about/team/#mario.
9. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher - Biography, Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.
gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2789&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na.
10. See, e.g., Evgeni Georgiev - Biography, Harvard Law School, http://blogs.law.
harvard.edu/hnmcp/newsletters/client-spotlight-evgeni-georgiev-the-regional-court-of-sofia/.
11. See, e.g., John R. Tunheim - Biography, Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.
gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid =242 1 &cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na.
12. Ms. Postema is now Fellow for Human Rights, Criminal Justice and Prison Reform
in the Americas at Stanford Law School. See, e.g., Mirta Postema - Biography, Stanford
Law School, https://www.law.stanford.edu/profile/mirte-postema.
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section, building upon their conference presentations.13 This article
summarizes and contextualizes the participants' comments at the
conference and puts them in conversation with each other.
I. Judicial Role and Ethical Integrity
Judicial role may be contested or in flux within a single system.
In the United States, debates have raged on such foundational
matters as both normative and descriptive accounts of appellate court
judgingl 4 and the meaning and proper scope of managerial judging at
the trial court level.' 5 These debates have shifted over time as
conditions and epistemologies have changed. 1 6
Given the plurality of views within a single jurisdiction - the
United States - on the role of a judge, it is not surprising that some
13. Hualing Fu, Building Judicial Integrity in China, 39 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 167 (2016); Mario Joseph and Nicole Phillips, Judicial Corruption in Haiti: The Need
for Discipline and Civil Society Participation, 39 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 183
(2016); Judge Evgeni Georgiev, Independence of Bulgarian Judges, 39 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 211 (2016); Mirte Postema, Why Reforms Alone Are Insufficient to
Strengthen the Judiciary: A Case Study of Guatemala's Judicial Selection Processes, 39
HASTINGS INT'L & COM. L. REV. 237 (2016).
14. See generally, Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First
Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2006) ("The principal conceptions of judicial role are
points on an equilateral triangle. They are formalism, politics, and pragmatism.").
15. Compare Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 376, 380 (1982)
("[M]anagerial judging may be redefining sub silentio our standards of what constitutes
rational, fair, and impartial adjudication.") with E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and
the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 315-16 (1986) ("Some opponents of
managerial judging, led by Professor Resnik, contend that managerial judging is ineffective
- or at least, that the effectiveness of managerial judging has not been demonstrated. Here I
must respectfully part company with the loyal opposition.... [A]t least some managerial
techniques are effective in reducing the amount of time and effort invested in processing a
given case.").
16. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113
YALE L.J. 27, 76 (2003) ("This is not the first time that judges have updated their role in
response to new challenges. Nineteenth century trial practice witnessed evolutions in the
judicial role just as significant as the evolutions underway today in pretrial practice.
Twentieth century administrative law likewise saw changes in the judicial role that are
comparable to recent changes in class action practice."); Abram Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976) ("We are witnessing
the emergence of a new model of civil litigation and, I believe, our traditional conception of
adjudication and the assumption upon which it is based provide an increasingly unhelpful,
indeed misleading framework for assessing either the workability or legitimacy of the roles
of judge and court within this model.").
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disagreement existed across jurisdictions among our panelists.17
Most notably, Judge Scirica and Professor Fu defined judicial role by
reference to their own judicial systems' distinct structures." Judge
Scirica's understanding of what it means to be a judge was grounded
in the notion of separation of powers enshrined in Article III of the
United States Constitution and elaborated upon in subsequent
statutes and case law.19 Professor Fu had a different starting point:
"judges" in China are part of a single-party apparatus and thus have a
narrower function, i.e., to efficiently resolve disputes, rather than act
as a check on the overreaching of coordinate branches. 20
Variations in judicial role may produce different understandings
of judicial ethics and integrity. Judge Scirica identified independence
as the sine qua non of judicial ethical integrity. Conversely,
Professor Fu opined that Chinese judges, who do not aspire to be
politically independent, nevertheless can have ethical integrity and a
degree of independence, at least in private, routine disputes that do
not implicate governmental concerns. 2 1 As Professor Fu put it:
17. For a comparison of judicial systems by country, see, e.g., National Master, Judicial
branch: Countries Compared, http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Government
/Judicial-branch (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
18. For purposes of this article, I refer to Professor Fu's judicial system as the Chinese
judicial system, even though he is a professor of law in Hong Kong, which has its own
system. See generally JORGE OLIVEIRA & PAULO CARDINAL, EDS., ONE COUNTRY, Two
SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS - PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON MACAU'S
AUTONOMY AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA (2004).
19. Judge Scirica's comments track those he recently published elsewhere. See Anthony
J. Scirica, Madison Lecture - Judicial Governance and Judicial Independence, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 779 (2015).
20. Similarly, variations in conceptions of judicial role can be seen across common and
civil law systems. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 14, at 1055 ("The judicial role is also
different in a career judiciary - the system in the Continental European countries, Japan, and
indeed most countries in the world in which a judge begins his judicial career right after law
school and progresses, as in the normal civil service, to more and more responsible judicial
positions. In fact, judges in those systems are civil servants. Their advancement depends on
their satisfying their superiors' expectations, and the result is the kind of disciplined, docile,
and modest decision making characteristic of civil servants. In our judiciaries, and
particularly in the federal court system with its lateral entry into positions that carry lifetime
tenure, the role played by the judge is bound to be different and freer, especially given the
individualism that is so characteristic of Americans."); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery
and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1019
(1998) ("[A]ll the common law systems begin with a concept of the adversary system,
which defines the roles of the judge and the parties' advocates.... The premise in civil law
jurisdictions is entirely different, at least formally so.").
21. It is not always obvious how to draw the line between routine and politically
sensitive cases. For example, what appears to be a routine private dispute - say a traffic
152 [Vol. 39:1
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"There are 10 million cases per year [in China]. So there must be
some degree of independence, competence and trust, or people
would not come to court." 2 2
Despite these differences, and at a certain level of generality,
there was apparent consensus regarding the nature of the judicial role
and of judicial ethical integrity. No one disagreed with Judge
Scirica's statement that - across systems - the primary function of a
judge is to uphold the rule of law. The panelists gave most attention
to the same three challenges to that function, discussed in the
following section.
II. Ethical Integrity Challenges Facing the Judiciary
Panelists emphasized three challenges to judicial ethical integrity
above all others: competence, independence, and corruption.
A. Competence
All panelists recognized the need for a base level of judicial
competence twinned with accountability for failure to meet minimum
standards. However, panelists differed, depending on country of
origin, on the threat lack of competence currently poses to judicial
accident - may end up being politically sensitive because one of the parties involved in the
accident is a relative of a party official. Similarly, a commercial dispute between private
parties could implicate government regulatory aims. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S
LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 286-87 (2002) ("Cases may be politically sensitive
because they involve a prominent political figure, dissidents, or social organizations such as
Falungong. Or they may involve potential conflicts between the judiciary and other state
organs ... ").
22. See also Zhu Suli, The Party and the Courts, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA:
LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION 53 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010)
("Visions of judicial independence drawn from distinctly Western experience are not
particularly meaningful for modern China, and evaluations and judgments based on these
experiences or from their underlying ideology ... have limited academic value and practical
use for China."); Randall Peerenboom, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: COMMON MYTHS
AND UNFOUNDED ASSUMPTIONS, IN JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL
RULE OF LAW PROMOTION (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010), at 70 ("[G]eneral statements
about the lack of judicial independence or impossibility of achieving judicial independence
in a single-party state fail to capture the complex reality of China or other authoritarian
regimes."). But see Frank K. Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant if He Stays with His
Sheep? Justice in Rural China, 114 YALE L.J. 1675, 1703-07 (2005) (criticizing a book by
Zhu Suli for failing to fully confront the role of politics in the Chinese judicial system, one
that is difficult to neatly pin down).
2016] 153
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
ethical integrity and, to a lesser extent, on the benchmarks for
assessing and ensuring competence. Panelists from countries with
long-standing procedures for training lawyers and judges, vetting and
selecting judicial candidates, and monitoring and disciplining judges
who fall below minimum standards placed relatively less emphasis
on competence as a key challenge to ethical integrity. For example,
Judge Scirica pointed out that the expectation in the United States is
that judges will be of above-average competence; however, he
recognized that judicial ethical integrity can tolerate judges' varying
degrees of skill. As Judge Scirica put it, "We all don't need to be
Justice Holmes."
By contrast, panelists from Haiti - where judges are not
systematically trained, vetted based on skill and experience, or held
accountable for falling below minimum standards - found
competence to be a current and pressing challenge to the judiciary's
ethical integrity. Mr. Joseph, a human rights lawyer in Haiti, gave the
example of Judge Lamarre Belizaire. According to Mr. Joseph, Judge
Belizaire was appointed by President Michel Martelly even though
he did not meet Haiti's formal requirement of five years of
experience. Moreover, Judge Belizaire has not been disciplined as a
judge for his actions, including his allegedly improper use of his
office to pursue political dissidents, even though his actions
prompted the Port-au-Prince Bar Association to disbar him for 10
years (commencing on the date he steps down from the bench).23
Other panelists characterized judicial incompetence as a threat
their systems had recently confronted with some success. Judge
Georgiev identified specific reforms made in Bulgaria in the last
decade, including, among others:24 the establishment in 2004 of an
23. See http://www.ijdh.org/2015/02/topics/law-justice/speech-on-judicial-corruption-
at-uc-hastings-symposium/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (containing Mr. Joseph's prepared
remarks delivered at the conference); http://canadahaitiaction.ca/aggregator/sources/1 ?page
=3 (same) (last visited Apr. 19, 2015). See also Maria Coladonato, Haiti's Fragile
Democracy, Jurist, available at http://jurist.org/forum/2014/08/lauren-carasik-haiti-dem
ocracy.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2015) (describing similar allegations by Mr. Joseph, who has
been defending former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in proceedings overseen by Judge
Belizaire).
24. Judge Georgiev's assessment of Bulgaria's progress was roughly consistent with the
American Bar Association Rule of Law Institute's recent reviews of Bulgaria's judicial
system, though that report is more critical of Bulgaria's recent efforts to improve judicial
competence. See ABA ROLI, Judicial Reform Review for Bulgaria, Volume IV at 15, 17
(2013), available at http://www.bili-bg.org/cdir/bili-bg.org/files/INDEXFINALENGL
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official training center for new judges; the development of a
centralized selection process, which, for persons seeking
appointment as junior judges, involves a competitive centralized
exam; the imposition of a longer and more intensive review process
before tenure is granted to new judges; and an increase of judicial
salary that has attracted higher caliber candidates.25 Similarly,
Professor Fu praised improvements over the past two decades in the
education and training of judges 26 and in the professionalization27 of
the judiciary as evidence of a general trend toward increasing ethical
integrity of the judiciary in China.
B. Independence
Threats to independence place pressure on the judge's core
function to uphold the law via impartial decision-making. Judge
Scirica defined the two key dimensions of judicial independence:
decisional and institutional.28 Decisional independence is the ability
ISH.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2015) ("[A] common concern expressed by numerous
interviewees was that there seems to be insufficient emphasis on centralized coordination,
strategic planning and general direction towards reform in the judicial system in general."),
at 15 ("Overall, Bulgaria's progress in legal reform continues to move forward, albeit
slowly.... However, there have been some delays and particular difficulties in the areas of
responsibility for strategic planning, the governance of the judicial system and the
development and application of efficient procedures for performance evaluation and career
advancement."), at 17 ("Judges are required to have formal university-level legal training,
but its quality remains debatable.").
25. Judge Georgiev saw areas for improvement. For example, while he saw the recent
adoption of a code of judicial ethics as a positive development, Judge Georgiev noted that,
with the exception of the year 2009 in which fofty-one judges were disciplined, mostly in
connection with the same event, the code is not systematically enforced.
26. Professor Fu's observations regarding increasing judicial competence in China echo
those of other observers. See, e.g., DONALD C. CLARKE, CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM: NEW
DEVELOPMENTS, NEW CHALLENGES (Cambridge University Press 2008) ("Despite the
limited goals of the official plans, courts have undertaken significant reforms designed to
strengthen the competence of judges and the professionalism of the court system.");
Nicholas C. Howson, China's Judicial System and Judicial Reform, Law Quad. Notes 54
No. 1 (2011): 62-4, available at http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1002&context-other (last visited Apr. 12, 2015) ("Recently I have spent a
significant amount of time studying Chinese People's Court judicial opinions in the
corporate law and securities regulation areas, and have come across examples of extremely
competent judicial work by the People's Courts at all levels.").
27. By "professionalism," Professor Fu said he meant a community of specialists using
a common language grounded in a common knowledge (here, of the law), and working
toward their common interest and advantage.
28. Scirica, supra note 19, at 782.
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of a judge to render a judgment without political pressure or personal
bias; this independence is enshrined by, among other things, the
insulation of federal judges from political pressures via life tenure
and non-diminution of salary. Institutional independence is the
structural autonomy of the judicial branch as a coequal branch, which
Judge Scirica characterized as a necessary condition for decisional
independence because external regulation of judicial conduct could
chill impartiality.2 9
Every judicial system struggles with independence. 30 Even in
the United States, judicial independence faces pressures. First,
independence in the United States is not absolute. Judges must be
accountable, but for what and to whom? Judge Scirica noted that
federal judges can be impeached only for high crimes and
misdemeanors - not for unpopular or even poorly reasoned
decisions.31 Congress creates and regulates the lower federal courts 32
but has granted the courts self-regulatory power, retaining only an
oversight role.33 However, in furtherance of its regulatory function,
Congress has the ability to overreach, such as via (ultimately failed)
bills in Congress for the creation of an inspector general with
29. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Perspectives on Judicial Independence: What Do We
Mean by "Judicial Independence"?, 64 Om1o ST. L.J. 323, 326 (2003) (defining decisional
independence as "freedom to decide a case as the court sees fit without any constraint");
Charles G. Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters for Judicial
Independence, 21 GEO.J.LEGAL ETHICS 1259, (2008) ("Institutional independence concerns the
capacity of the judiciary as a separate branch of government to resist encroachments from
the political branches and thereby preserve the separation of powers.").
30. Heike Gramckow, International Trends - Strengthening Judicial Independence and
Accountability, in Future Trends in State Courts 2005 112 (Tracy Peters et al. eds., National
Center for State Courts 2005), available at http://cdml6501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref
/collection/judicial/id/256 (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) ("Even established democracies
struggle to ensure an independent judiciary.")
31. See U.S. Const., Art. II, §4; U.S. Const., Art III, §1 (judges shall "hold their offices
during good behaviour" and shall receive a compensation "which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office."); Anthony J. Scirica, Judicial Governance and Judicial
Independence, 90 N.Y.U. L. REv. 3 (2015); James E. Pfander, Removing Federal Judges, 74
U. CHI. L. REv. 1227, 1230 (2007) ("the framers of the Constitution repeatedly and quite
uniformly described impeachment and removal as the exclusive mode of judging judicial
misbehavior.").
32. See U.S. Const., Art III, §1; 28 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. ("Judiciary and Judicial
Procedure.").
33. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980); Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act Subcommittee, Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice (2006), available at http://www.
fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/breyer06.pdf/$file/breyerO6.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2015).
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subpoena and contempt power to investigate judicial conduct; 34 this
approach conflicts with the current self-regulatory approach.
Second, state court judges do not enjoy the insulation from political
pressures that is so critical to decisional independence in those state
court systems where judges must periodically run for office in
elections often funded by campaign contributions from litigants and
lawyers who may appear before those same judges.35
The challenges to judicial independence in an established
democracy like the United States pale in comparison to the
challenges faced in countries where the judiciary is not structurally a
separate and properly insulated branch 36 or where, regardless of the
formal structure, coordinate branches influence judicial outcomes.
Conference panelists on judicial ethical integrity addressed both
kinds of challenges. As noted, China is an example of a country with
a judicial system that does not formally, structurally permit an
independent judiciary.3 7 Haiti, Bulgaria, and various Latin American
countries represent the latter type of challenge to independence,
where judges are susceptible to pressures from other political actors
despite formal separation of the judiciary.
34. See Mark C. Miller, The View of the Courts from the Hill: Interactions Between
Congress and the Federal Judiciary 172 (2009) (describing legislative proposals); Judicial
Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act, S. 575, 113th Cong. (2013), available at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1 13/s575/text (last visited Apr. 16, 2015).
35. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for
Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 133, 134
(1998) (Expenditures by lawyers and litigants on judicial election campaigns are a "grave
threat to judicial independence because they risk both the reality of undue influence and the
appearance of impropriety.").
36. To be truly independent, a judiciary that is structurally separate from other branches
of government must also enjoy other facets of what Isaiah Berlin characterized as "negative
liberty," i.e., freedom from interference of various kinds, including from physical
compulsion and pecuniary consequences. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 535, 537-548 (1999).
37. See Keith E. Henderson, Halfvay Home and a Long Way to Go, in Judicial
Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion (Randall Peerenboom
ed., 2010), at 28 ("The legal concept of judicial independence is embedded in China's last
three Chinese constitutions (1912, 1954, and 1982). However, a review of twentieth century
Chinese history reveals that the full meaning of this concept has long been debated and that
conflicting provisions of these constitutions, as well as actual political practice, have meant
that judicial independence has usually been interpreted to only apply to the judicial
decision-making process related to individual cases - not the institutional independence of
the judiciary.").
38. See CATHERINE DUPRE, IMPORTING THE LAW IN POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITIONS 22
(2003) ("The principle of separation of powers is guaranteed by all post-communist
constitutions," including Bulgaria's Constitution of 1991); Maria Dakolias, The Judicial
2016] 157
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By way of example, Mr. Joseph noted that the Superior Council
of Judicial Power created in 2012 to appoint, monitor, and discipline
Haitian judges has become politicized and is now "just a tool of the
Haitian government." 3 9 Relatedly, judges, though formally separate
from the executive branch, act in a manner that demonstrates its
influence. For example, Mr. Joseph offered his perspective on the
case of a "corrupt mayor in a small remote town in the South of
Haiti" who allegedly ordered the murder of human rights activists.
Though a magistrate judge recommended a trial on murder charges,
the trial judge refused.4 0
C. Corruption
The boundary between corruption and independence as
challenges to the ethical integrity of the judiciary is a fuzzy one.
Threats to independence are usually either structural (e.g., a judiciary
that is not separate from other organs of government) or take the
form of pressure applied to judges, often by other government
officials, to influence outcomes (e.g., threats to remove judges or
reduce their salaries). Corruption, on the other hand, is commonly
thought to involve the seduction of judges, by public or private
parties, where a judge actually succumbs for his private gain.4 An
Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean: Elements of Reform 8, n. 31 (World Bank,
1996) ("In all Latin American countries, one observes the formal, structural independence
that is guaranteed in the constitutions of the region.... However, these structural
mechanisms in Latin American constitutions have not guaranteed the courts' decision
making autonomy or substantive independence."); P.B., Haiti's Judiciary, Just What the
Doc Ordered, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 2012 (noting contrast between formal separation of
powers and the apparent influence of the executive branch over the judicial system,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21546856/print (last visited Apr. 19, 2015).
39. See supra note 23 (Mr. Joseph's prepared remarks).
40. Id. See also https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/haiti#.VTQybVy
5ell (last visited Oct. 13, 2015) (reporting on the same case).
41. See Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in
Judicial Systems at 3, 122 (2007) (defining corruption as "abuse of entrusted power for
private gain"), available at http://www.cmi.no/publications /file/5091-courts-corruption-
and-judicial-independence.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2015); Siri Gloppen, Courts, Corruption
and Judicial Independence, in CORRUPTION, GRABBING AND DEVELOPMENT (TINA SOREIDE
& ALED WILLIAMS eds. 2014), at 69 ("Corruption is commonly defined as the misuse of
public office or entrusted power for private gain. When we talk about judicial system
corruption (judicial corruption for short) the paradigmatic image is that of judges taking
bribes. Judicial corruption is a lot more, however. It includes all forms of inappropriate
influence that may damage the impartiality of justice," emphasis in original), available at
158 [Vol. 39:1
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example of a threat to judicial ethical integrity that straddles the line
is the situation of a state trial court judge in the United States who
must win an election in order to retain his position and who hears
cases involving parties or counsel who contribute to the judge's
election campaign. Some observers categorize that circumstance as a
threat to independence, whereas others see it as implicating the threat
of corruption.
The extent to which corruption poses a threat to judicial ethical
integrity in a particular system depends substantially on two factors:
the general pervasiveness of corruption in society and the
effectiveness of mechanisms of judicial accountability. Judge Scirica
noted that, while corrupt judges may exist in the United States, they
are the exception rather than the norm; this is partly due to oversight
and accountability mechanisms, especially in the federal system, and
to the fact that judges live in a society and are trained in an
educational system that values ethical integrity. Professor Fu
attributed pervasive corruption in the judiciary in China to the
pervasiveness of corruption in Chinese society in general. Mr. Joseph
attributed the challenge corruption poses to the Haitian judiciary -
including the frequency of bribes paid to judges - to lack of judicial
accountability; no institution oversees the judiciary in Haiti and it
does not self-regulate.42
Panelists disagreed regarding the role of economic adversity in
generating corruption as a threat to the judiciary.4 3 It is clear that
poverty and corruption are linked44 and that economic prosperity, or
http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/5091-courts-corruption-and-judicial-independence.pdf
(last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
42. See generally JEAN SENAT FLEURY, CHALLENGES OF JUDICIAL REFORM IN HAITI 19-
20 (2007) ("In its operation, the Haitian judicial system allows the worst iniquities of the
country's entire social fabric to proliferate.").
43. This disagreement mirrored the lack of consensus regarding the relationship in
general between rule of law and economic development. See JAMES J. HECKMAN, ROBERT
L. NELSON & LEE CABATINGAN, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAw 6-7 (2010)
("[T]here have been active debates ... the direction of causation between economic and
legal development. Historical and cross-national comparisons loom large in this literature,
as scholars have sought to explain seeming anomalies of nations that have achieved rapid
rates of economic growth while not developing all aspects of a rule of law system.").
44. Office of Democracy and Governance, USAID Program Brief, Reducing
Corruption in the Judiciary at 1 (2009) ("The linkages between poverty reduction, economic
growth, and democratic governance are firmly established in current development thinking,
backed by persuasive research. Equally well established is the recognition by scholars,
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the search for it, can inspire judicial reform.45 But is prosperity a
necessary condition of judicial ethical integrity? Judge Scirica
asserted that the answer to the question - whatever it is - should not
inspire a fatalism regarding or an acceptance of corruption. Mr.
Joseph asserted the primacy of lack of accountability rather than
economic adversity as the source of corruption in the judiciary. The
problems of poverty and corruption are linked, Mr. Joseph argued,
but it is wealthy people in Haiti who are often the most corrupt.
II. Solutions to the Ethical Integrity Challenges
Effectively meeting ethical integrity challenges to judicial
integrity requires time for the judiciary and the society in which it is
embedded to develop a culture of legality and an immediate
commitment to create the institutional arrangements and procedures
that tend to foster and support judicial integrity.
A. The Long Term Fix: Cultural Transformation
The core ethical integrity challenges conference panelists
identified as plaguing judicial systems - including competence,
independence, and corruption - are linked to the cultures in which
the judiciaries are embedded.46 Judge William Fletcher relayed the
story of Dean Griswold, who, when asked how a country could
achieve the level and quality of judicial independence in the United
States, reportedly said "start 500 years ago." Latin American
policy makers, and development practitioners of the central importance of the rule of law
and the control of corruption for successfully addressing the related challenges of social,
economic, and political development.").
45. See, e.g., Weixia Gu, Courts in China: Judiciary in the Economic and Societal
Transitions, in Asian Courts in Context 488 (Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang eds.,
2015) ("The traditional theory of the Chinese judiciary has been that the courts, together
with other judicial organs.. .are 'weapons' of the people's democratic dictatorship.
However, as the emphasis on the socialist market economy grew, it was increasingly
stressed that the courts' task is to contribute to economic construction.").
46. Shimon Shetreet, Creating a Culture of Judicial Independence: The Practical
Challenge and the Conceptual and Constitutional Infrastructure, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 17 (Shimon
Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2012) ("Judicial independence must be supported by the
political climate and social consensus. The political leadership and the professional and legal
elite must work together to develop a culture of judicial independence.").
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countries provide a useful example of the problem posed by
insufficiently deeply rooted democratic traditions. The current legal
culture in Latin American countries in general is the product of
historical conditions characterized by significant military presences,
relatively recent transitions to democracy, and a tradition of judicial
submissiveness to political elites.47 While these conditions have
hampered the development of a culture of legality in Latin America,
they also point to the solution, i.e., nurturing that same culture, a
project that takes not only commitment, but also time.
B. The Short Term Fix: Institutional Arrangements and Processes
As Judge Fletcher exhorted the conference attendees, "There is
no time like the present to start." Even if the conditions for ethical
integrity do not yet exist, procedures can be put into place that set a
judiciary on a trajectory toward achieving that goal. Identifying those
procedures and gaining momentum in favor of their adoption is
partly the product of exchanges of the kind the UC Hastings
Professional Ethical Integrity conference accomplished. Judge John
Tunheim emphasized the importance of building relationships among
judges globally as one critical means of advancing that dialogue.4 8
Institutional arrangements and procedures can be matched to the
components of ethical integrity they are meant to buttress, including
competence, independence, and resistance to corruption.
47. See Mirte Postema, Professional Ethical Integrity: Cornerstone for Rule of Law
Reform Around the Globe, UC Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco, California
(February 26-27, 2015), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/news/articles/2015/02/ethi
cal-integrity-symposium.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2015); see generally Elin Skaar, Judicial
Independence and Human Rights in Latin America: Violations, Politics, and Prosecution
(2011); Mariana Sousa, A Brief Overview of Judicial Reform in Latin America: Objectives,
Challenges, and Accomplishments, in THE STATE OF STATE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA
(Eduardo Lora ed., 2007), available at https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr-&id=gD
JlGlItIiYC&oi=fnd&pg-PA87&dq=skaar+latin+american+military+dictatorships&ots-tDr
kaD9o-7&sig-BKcxiEW6rbk5dXljpPIl3xErxoE#v-onepage&q&f=false (last visited Apr.
22, 2015).
48. Judge Tunheim's biography provides examples of the efforts he has personally
made to advance an exchange of ideas regarding judicial ethical integrity globally. See
http://www.hhh.umn.edu/people/johntunheim/pdf/Tunheim.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
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1. Competence
Panelists proposed a bundle of solutions to the challenge posed
by lack of judicial competence, including rigorous training, merit-
based selection and promotion processes, equitable allocation of
work among judges within a system, compensation sufficient to
attract qualified persons to the bench, and the adoption and
enforcement of codes of judicial conduct. 4 9 The central feature of
this reform package is a merit-based system that is consistently and
transparently applied. Consistency and transparency promote the
effort to strike the correct balance between accountability and
independence, the fear being that regulation could otherwise be used
as a tool to control rather than to increase the capacity of the
judiciary.50
2. Independence
Even in countries that lack formal or informal structures to
assure judicial independence, procedures that move incrementally in
that direction can be adopted.1 One strategy is to identify pieces of
an independent structure that can fly under the radar due to their
technical nature. For example, the Due Process of Law Foundation
has developed guidelines for the selection of judges that Ms.
49. Judge Georgiev cited the use and development of many of these processes as key to
the improving competence of the Bulgarian judiciary. Ms, Postema emphasized selection,
by way of example, in her remarks summarized in the next section.
50. The panelists' suggestions are consistent with proposals made in United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, Resource Guide on Strengthening Judicial Integrity and
Capacity (2011) [hereinafter "Resource Guide"], available at http://www.unodc.org/doc
uments/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/ResourceGuideonStrengtheningJudiciallntegrityandC
apacity/1 1-85709_ebook.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
51. See generally supra notes 2-4 (identifying statements of principles which can be
translated to specific reforms); UNODC Resource Guide, supra note 50, at 1 ("Work on this
Guide began following ECOSOC Resolution 23/2006, which endorsed the Bangalore
Principles on Judicial Conduct and requested the United Nationals Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) to convene an open-ended intergovernmental expert group ... to develop a
technical guide on approaches to the provision of technical assistance aimed at strengthening
judicial integrity and capacity."); Office of Democracy and Governance, Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International
Development, Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality(January 2002)
(listing various reforms), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs /PNACM007.pdf (last
visited Apr. 22, 2015).
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Postema reported have gained traction, in part because they do not
create immediate gains or losses for political players. 2
Ms. Postema added another dimension to the discussion of
independence, which is not only a function of separation, but also of
concentration of judicial power. If power is concentrated with one
Supreme Court, then it is easier for other governmental actors to
control the judiciary by controlling that one court. So a diffusion of
power within the judiciary, along with transparent procedures for
holding judges accountable within the judiciary, aids what Ms.
Postema characterizes as "internal independence" of the judiciary.5 3
3. Corruption
Panelists' proposed solutions to the problem of judicial
corruption overlapped considerably with the proposed solutions to
the challenge to ethical integrity posed by competence. Training,
merit-based selection and promotion, adoption and enforcement of
judicial codes, and higher salaries are all steps that can steel judges
against temptation. 54 Judge Tunheim proposed an additional
corruption-fighting tool: the spectacle of punishment. He
recommended the empowerment of specialized prosecutors to pursue
charges of corruption in transparent hearings, resulting in convictions
that serve as an example to all judicial officers, combined with the
52. Due Process of Law Foundation, Guidelines for a Transparent and Merit-Based
System for the Appointment of High-Level Judges, available at http://www.dplf.org/s
ites/default/files/guidelines-selection_of highlevel.judges.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
53. See Due Process of Law Foundation, Evaluation of Judicial Corruption in Central
America and Panama and the Mechanisms to Combat It: Executive Summary and Regional
Comparative Study 3, 31 (2007), available at http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/11967
15002_0.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2015) (defining "internal independence" as "that of each
judge with respect to the structure of the organization").
54. Under some circumstances, there may be tradeoffs between battling corruption and
increasing judicial independence, commonly framed as a tension between independence and
accountability. See Mark Tushnet, Judicial Accountability in Comparative Perspective, in
Accountability in the Contemporary Constitution 74 (Nicholas Bamforth & Peter Leyland
eds. 2013) ("Judicial accountability and its obverse judicial independence are important
components of constitutional design. Their relationship is complex, with numerous variants
in design that all can achieve any specified accommodation of accountability and
independence."); Transparency International, Combatting Corruption in Judicial Systems
Advocacy Toolkit 20 (2007) ("Judicial independence and judicial accountability are often
thought of as being in opposition with one another, but the key is the maintenance of
balance," available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/Ju
diciaryAdvocacyToolKit.pdf (last visited June 11, 2015).
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opening of the judiciary to the glare of media exposure to shine a
public light on judicial practices. Judge Tunheim noted that no one
reform works as a magic bullet against corruption and that any mix
of solutions should be adopted and applied with an understanding of
root causes of corruption in each country; to prevent judges from
being seduced, it helps to know why they succumb.
C The Value ofExternal Pressure
The concept of using external (foreign) pressure to reform
judicial systems, e.g., as a condition of receiving aid, received a
mixed reaction from panelists. As Ms. Postema argued, it is difficult
to impose reform from the outside." Reformers exist within every
system; the key is to build bridges to and to empower them.5 6
External involvement in judicial reform has a greater chance of
succeeding when invited into a country. For example, Guatemala
reached an agreement with the United Nations to help that country
investigate and dismantle organized crime structures,5 7 something the
country on its own may not have been able to do. Judge Georgiev,
55. See Hiram E. Chodosh, Reforming Judicial Reform Inspired by U.S. Models, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 351, 360-361 (2002) ("Short of full occupation and micromanagement by a
foreign power or international institution, external pressure and assistance are limited in
their effect on local behaviors of a judicial system.").
56. See Kirsti Samuels, Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Operational
Initiatives and Lessons Learnt 20 (October 2006) ("A key point to emphasize is that law
reform in any country requires demand for change. For the changes to be sustainable and
implemented there must be a demand among the population, and local champions of the
changes to drive the reform, be it citizens, membership organizations, human rights
activists, opposition parties, etc."), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INT
CPR/Resources/WP37_web.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2015). Ms. Postema's comments
echoed a reaction to rule of law approaches in general, the "legal empowerment" model. See
Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative
(October 2003) ("An alternative, more balanced approach [compared to rule of law
approaches] often is preferable: legal empowerment - the use of legal services and related
development activities to increase disadvantaged populations' control over their lives. This
alternative paradigm, a manifestation of community-driven and rights-based development, is
grounded in grassroots needs and activities but can translate community-level work into
impact on national laws and institutions," bracketed text added, available at http://carneg
ieendowment.org/files/wp4l.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
57. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the State of Guatemala on the
Establishment of an International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, dated
December 12, 2006, available at http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents /mandato/cicig.
acuerdo.en.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
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speaking of the Bulgarian experience, adopted a more optimistic
view of the role of external pressure to promote judicial reform;
conditions for NATO and European Union membership inspired
reformers in Bulgaria, suggesting that external pressure had a
positive impact on judicial ethical integrity in that country.
Commitments by countries to adopt international principles on
rule of law and civil rights can help to leverage reform efforts. Judge
Tunheim found that such covenants could be persuasively cited as a
basis for reforms necessary to implement them. One of the more
prominent statements, the Bangalore Principles,59 has received
widespread recognition 60 and inspired the development of specific
guidelines and benchmarks for their effective implementation. 6 1
The road to judicial ethical integrity is unending. Even established
democracies must trudge it to manage the challenges to ethical
integrity that, though similar at a certain level of abstraction, vary in
intensity and expression by system. The Professional Ethical
Integrity conference at UC Hastings provided an opportunity for
fellow travelers to share their experiences and aspirations, building
58. See Janusz Bugajski, Westem Balkans Policy Review 2010: A Report of the CSIS
Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair in Southeast European Studies 13 (2010) ("There is reason for
optimism regarding the EU's enlargement strategy vis-A-vis the Westem Balkans due to its
previous record of success in the 10 countries of Entral and Eastern Europe. After decades
of Soviet control, these 10 countries - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria - were transformed from
authoritarian regimes into multiparty democracies.... Although the accession to the EU of
Romania and Bulgaria remains controversial due to their continuing struggle to implement
judicial reforms, EU policy has been a remarkable success in supporting the larger European
integration project. The driving forces in this extraordinary transformation have been the
twin prospects of EU and NATO membership"), available at http://csis.org/files/pu
blication/1 00917_Bugajski WestemBalkansWEB.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
59. See supra note 2.
60. The Hon. Michael Kirby, AC, CMG, Judicial Integrity: Principles, Strategy, and
Implementation, Regional Workshop on Judicial Integrity in Southeast Asia, Jakarta,
Indonesia, January 26-27, 2012 ("The Bangalore Principles have been the principal focus of
many global and regional meetings of judges, including the regional workshop held in
Jakarta in January 2011. Since the establishment of the JIG in 2000, I have served as
Rapporteur of the Group. Its principles have increasingly been accepted by the judiciary
around the world"), available at http://www.michaelkirby.com.au/images/stories/speeche
s/2000s/2012/2582.%20SPEECH%20%20REGIONAL%20WORKSHOP%200N%20JUDI
CIAL%20INTEGRITY.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
61. See Measures for the Effective Implementation of The Bangalore Principles of
Judicial Conduct, Adopted by the Judicial Integrity Group at its Meeting Held in Lusaka,
Zambia, January 21-22, 2010, available at http://www.summitofhighcourts.com/2013/docs
/standarts/UN2.pdf (last visited April 23, 2015); UNODC Resource Guide, supra note 50.
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community and connections - nourishment for the journey ahead.
